claimed that the appropriate relevant market was access to AOL subscribers-which Cyber said were a type of "electronic island to which AOL controls the only bridge." The court said that this definition of the relevant market for assessing competitive impacts was unrealistically narrow and tailored solely for purposes of the lawsuit. Not only did CompuServe and many others provide access to the Net, but AOL's own subscribers could be reached through billboards, direct mail, newspapers, and TV. AOL's Net included only 15% of the current e-mail population and half of the Internet user population.
Cyber complained further that AOL was selling other advertisers the right to have pop-up messages appear on AOL screens, and therefore AOL was favoring itself as a competitor over Cyber. The court's reaction was that AOL was not obliged to give Cyber free advertising access. To the contrary, if Cyber wanted to advertise over AOL, it should pay AOL as AOL's advertising customers did. To the court, Cyber's argument was like an advertising agency telling its customers that "for a fee it can get an advertiser's ads for get-rich-quick schemes and phone-sex services in a daily newspaper for dissemination to the subscribers without having to pay any fee to the newspaper." When the newspaper refuses to carry the ads, "the advertising agency sues against the monopoly of access to the subscribers."
Finally, the court held that it was legitimate for AOL to block Cyber's e-mail. The millions of Cyber e-mail messages burdened AOL's lines. Moreover, AOL's subscribers complained bitterly to AOL about Cyber because they had to pay for access time to delete Cyber's messages, which they did not want to sift through. Essentially, AOL was engaging in self-defense.
Clearly, the Philadelphia district court reached a right result. Neither the First Amendment nor the antitrust laws require Net users to be harassed with junk e-mail. That doesn't mean, however, that other cases cannot present real free speech and competitive access problems. Consider the following possible controversies.
Should Net access service providers be obliged to block access to all alleged copyright infringers' postings, under risk of heavy copyright damage liability? The question presents an issue similar to that of the Cyber-AOL case, but from a different vantage point. Can a Net access service provider readily determine whether a poster's use of copyrighted material is a fair use? Fair use is privileged under the law to give the public the benefit of robust public dialog. The public would be a loser if fair use becomes too risky for Net postings. (See Micro Law, June 1996.) On the other hand, is unauthorized reproduction of portions of copyrighted works in Internet postings essential to discussion of their merit or lack or merit? Should the copyright laws be used to choke off such debate? Or suppose that major Net access providers all decided to block access to shareware marts. Would that impair competition because of denial of an essential facility?
The weakness of Cyber's claims in this case is manifest. But the underlying principles that Cyber mistakenly invoked here can resonate importantly in cases yet to come.
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After this column was written, I received additional news of a related development.
To shield its equipment from Cyber, CompuServe developed software that filtered out messages listing Cyber in headers as the sender. In response, Cyber modified its software to give a false header, which circumvented CompuServe's filtering software. CompuServe sued Cyber in federal court in Columbus, Ohio, for "trespass to chattels" (personal property) under Ohio law.
Making findings similar to those that the Philadelphia federal court made in the Cyber-AOL case, the Ohio court (Feb. 3, 1997) held that Cyber committed trespass. The court entered a preliminary injunction forbidding Cyber from sending any further unsolicited e-mail ("spamming" or junk e-mail) to CompuServe's subscribers.
The law against trespass to chattels originally applied, in the 18th century, only to taking away someone else's tangible property (for example, a horse). Relying on later precedents, however, such as a Washington case holding computer hacking to be computer trespass, the court ruled that intentional intermeddling with somebody else's computer was trespass under Ohio law because it caused economic injury:
To the extent that defendant's multitudinous electronic mailings demand the disk space and drain the processing power of plaintiff's computer equipment ... the value of that equipment to CompuServe is diminished even though it is not physically damaged by defendant's conduct.
The court found further damage in customer anger at CompuServe and termination of accounts because of junk e-mail.
At the same time, the court rejected Cyber's contentions that CompuServe was a public utility or common carrier, obliged to accept all comers; that CompuServe consented to Cyber's spamming by connecting to the Internet; and that the First Amendment entitled Cyber to engage in free speech electronically directed to CompuServe's subscribers.
On the last point, the court suggested that Cyber should set up a Web page or online bulletin board. Since these alternatives, as well as nonelectronic means of communication, were adequate and available to Cyber, any First Amendment right to communicate did not trump CompuServe's private property rights. Cyber said the alternatives were not adequate, because they were not as cheap as spamming. But the Ohio court said (as the Philadelphia court did) that CompuServe was not obliged to subsidize Cyber's speech.
Finally, the court held that public interest favored an injunction because spamming burdened the Net and decreased its viability as an effective means of communication for others. Contrary to Cyber's contentions, suppressing junk mail benefits (not harms) CompuServe subscribers. If any CompuServe subscribers feel otherwise, they can terminate their accounts and transfer to an access provider that accepts junk e-mail, the court said. "That is a business risk which CompuServe has assumed."
